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Abstract—This paper studies the information-theoretic se-
crecy capacity of an Offset-QAM-based filterbank multicar-
rier (FBMC-OQAM) communication over a wiretap frequency
selective channel. The secrecy capacity is formulated as an
optimization problem which has a closed-form solution in the
high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. Two of the most com-
mon equalization strategies in FBMC-OQAM are considered,
namely, single-tap and multi-tap equalization. For the sake of
comparison, we also consider the secrecy capacity of a generic
modulation and a cyclic prefix-orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (CP-OFDM) modulation. As a result, we find that
FBMC-OQAM is particularly competitive for medium-to-long
burst transmissions.
Keywords—FBMC-OQAM, secrecy capacity, multipath chan-
nel.
I. INTRODUCTION
The information-theoretic secrecy-capacity is defined as
the number of bits per channel use that can be reliably trans-
mitted from a legitimate transmitter (Alice) to a legitimate
receiver (Bob) while guaranteeing a negligible information
leakage to the eavesdropper (Eve). The seminal work of
Wyner [1] and its extension to more general channels [2],
have shown that a "physical advantage" at Bob with respect
to Eve is required to guarantee a larger-than-zero secrecy
capacity. Multipath channels lead to channel frequency selec-
tivity. If Alice knows the channel of Bob and Eve, she can
modulate her signal to take benefit of frequency bins where
Bob’s channel has an advantage over Eve’s channel. This
scenario has been studied in details in the case of multicarrier
modulations, including CP-OFDM [3]–[5].
However, to the best of the authors knowledge, we are
the first to analyze the secrecy capacity of the FBMC-
OQAM modulation, which has received increasing attention
in the last decades as an attractive alternative to CP-OFDM
modulation [6]. In this paper, we consider that Alice and
Bob communicate over a frequency selective channel using
FBMC-OQAM modulation/demodulation while Eve tries to
eavesdrop on the conversation. Based on this model, we
formulate the secrecy capacity as an optimization problem
that can be solved in closed-form at high SNR. At Bob
side, two of the most common equalization strategies in
FBMC-OQAM are considered, namely, multi-tap and single-
tap equalization [7]. We demonstrate that both equalization
schemes lead to equivalent performance for mildly frequency
selective channels. At Eve side, we additionally consider
the loss in secrecy occuring if she is not constrained to
apply conventional FBMC-OQAM demodulation. For the
sake of comparison, we also consider the secrecy capacity
of a generic modulation and a CP-OFDM modulation. In the
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Fig. 1: Transmission model over multipath channel equivalent
to a special case of MIMO wiretap channel.
end, we show that FBMC-OQAM is particularly competitive
for medium-to-long burst transmissions.
Notations: Vectors and matrices are denoted by bold
lowercase and uppercase letters a and A, respectively (resp.).
Superscripts ∗, T , H and † stand for conjugate, transpose,
Hermitian transpose and Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse. The
symbols tr[.], E(.), =(.) and <(.) denote the trace, expecta-
tion, imaginary and real parts, respectively.  is the imaginary
unit. ‖A‖ and |A| are the Frobenius norm and determinant
respectively. IN denotes the identity matrix of order N .
0N×M is a zero matrix of size N×M . Subscripts of matrices
are dropped whenever matrix dimensions are clear from the
context. diag(a) returns a diagonal matrix with a on its
diagonal. The positive part of a real quantity is denoted by
[a]+ = max(a, 0). σn(A) (or λn(A)) is the n-th largest
singular (or eigenvalue) of A. ⊗ stands for the Kronecker
product.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As depicted in Fig. 1, we consider a conventional wiretap
channel where Alice wants to communicate secretly with Bob
while Eve tries to eavesdrop on the communication. Alice
transmits a group of symbols d, modulated with matrix A
as s = Ad where s ∈ CN×1. We consider a constraint
on the power of the transmitted signal so that tr [Rs] ≤ P
with Rs = E(ssH) ∈ CN×N . The channel is modeled as
a multipath channel that is considered quasi-static, i.e., it
remains constant over the duration of the N symbols. The
channel impulse responses from Alice to Bob and Eve are
denoted by hB [n] and hE [n] respectively, of length LB and
LE , and are assumed to be known by Alice, which is a
common assumption [8]. The knowledge of Bob’s channel
can be acquired in practice through pilots and feedback,
or based on channel reciprocity in time division duplexing
mode. On the other hand, the knowledge of Eve’s channel is
a stronger assumption as she might remain passive. However,
if she is an active network node, Alice may also have
knowledge of her channel in the same way as Bob. The
vector of received samples at Bob and Eve are denoted by
rB ∈ CN+LB−1×1 and rE ∈ CN+LE−1×1. The multipath
channel can be modeled as a special case of the multiple-
input-multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel [9]
rB = HBs+wB , rE = HEs+wE , (1)
where the "MIMO" channel matrix HB ∈ CN+LB−1×N
has a Toeplitz structure with vector (hB [0], . . . , hB [LB −
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21],01×N−1)T as its first column and analogously for HE ∈
CN+LE−1×N . Note that HB and HE are both full rank
by construction. The noise vectors wB ∈ CN+LB−1×1 and
wE ∈ CN+LE−1×1 are modeled as zero mean circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian (ZMCSCG) vector with covari-
ance IN+LB−1 and IN+LE−1 respectively. The normalization
choice of a unit noise variance simplifies exposition and is
not a loss of generality since a difference in SNR can be
captured through a scaled channel gain. Bob (resp. Eve)
applies matrix BB (resp. BE) to demodulate and equalize
the received samples, obtaining zB (resp. zE).
III. GENERIC SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section, we are interested in the secrecy capacity
without imposing any constraint on the transmitter and the
receiver implying that A, BB and BE are identity matrices.
Using the general result of [2], the secrecy capacity of the
MIMO wiretap model of (1), under the power constraint
tr [Rs] ≤ P , can be written as
Cs = max
p(s,v),tr[Rs]≤P
I(v; rB)− I(v; rE), (2)
where I(.; .) is the mutual information, v is an auxiliary ran-
dom variable defined such that p(rB , rE |s, v) = p(rB , rE |s)
with p(.) being the probability density function. The result of
[10] states that the secrecy capacity of the general Gaussian
MIMO wiretap channel (1) is attained without channel prefix-
ing (v = s) and s has to follow a ZMCSCG with covariance
matrix Rs. Using this result, (2) can be further detailed so
that the secrecy capacity and the covariance matrix Rs can
be obtained by maximizing
Cs = max
Rs,tr[Rs]≤P
log
∣∣∣I+HBRsHHB ∣∣∣∣∣∣I+HERsHHE ∣∣∣ . (3)
This maximization problem is well known to be non convex
and no general closed-form solution exists [11]. Still, in
the high SNR regime, a closed-form solution of Cs exists.
The generalized singular value decomposition of the matrix
pair (HB ,HE) allows us to decompose the MIMO wiretap
channel into a set of parallel independent Gaussian wiretap
channels. This is analogous to the case with no eavesdrop-
per, where classical singular value decomposition allows to
convert the MIMO channel in a set of independent parallel
channels. Using the result of [11, Th. 2] in the case of
Ker(HE) ∩ Ker(HB)⊥ = ∅ (since HB and HE are of full
rank), we find
lim
P→+∞
Cs =
N∑
n=1
[
log σ2n
(
HBH
†
E
)]+
=
N∑
n=1
[log λn (CN )] ,
where CN = HHBHB(H
H
EHE)
−1. The fact that Ker(HE)∩
Ker(HB)⊥ = ∅ directly implies that Alice cannot commu-
nicate secretly with Bob by modulating her signal such that
it lies in the null space of Eve. Still, Alice can transmit in
channel modes where the gain at Bob is higher than Eve
but the secrecy capacity remains bounded as the SNR grows
large. This in contrast with the multi-antenna case where
Alice can use spatial beamforming to transmit in the null
space of Eve so that the capacity can be unbounded as the
SNR grows large [11].
Using the asymptotic properties of Toeplitz matrices, the
authors in [5] have further characterized the limiting behavior
of the latest expression as the number of symbols N in s
grows large
lim
N→+∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
[log λn (CN )]
+
=
∫ 1
0
[
log
|HB(f)|2
|HE(f)|2
]+
df,
with HB(f) =
∑LB−1
n=0 hB [n]e
−2pifn and HE(f) =∑LE−1
n=0 hE [n]e
−2pifn.
IV. SECRECY CAPACITY OF CP-OFDM
This section details the CP-OFDM secrecy capacity, as was
done in [5]. We assume that the cyclic prefix (CP) length
LCP is larger than LB−1 and LE−1. Under that condition,
successive OFDM blocks do not interfere and it is sufficient
to consider a single OFDM symbol that we denote by d ∈
CM×1 where M = N − LCP is the number of subcarriers.
The CP-OFDM modulation imposes the following structure
on the transmitted symbols
s = Ad, A =
(
0 ILCP
IM
)
FH ,
where F ∈ CM×M is the unitary FFT matrix. Note that the
total power is not equal before/after CP insertion so that the
transmit power constraint becomes tr [Rs] = tr[ARdAH ] ≤
P . At the receiver, Bob uses conventional OFDM demodu-
lation, i.e., CP removal and FFT
zB = BBrB = DBd+ w˜B ,
with
BB = F (0M×LCP IM 0M×LB−1)
DB = BBHBA = diag (HB(f0), ...,HB(fM−1))
w˜B = BBwB ,
and fm = m/M . At Eve side, two cases can be distinguished
for its receiver structure BE : 1) Eve uses a generic (ideal)
receiver in which case BE = I or 2) Eve uses conventional
(sub-optimal) OFDM demodulation as Bob implying that
BE = BB . It was shown in [5] that the secrecy capacity
is attained if symbols d are ZMCSCG. Then, the secrecy
capacity can be written as
COFDMs = max
R,tr[R]≤P
log
∣∣∣I+TBRTHB ∣∣∣∣∣∣I+TERTHE ∣∣∣ ,
where TB = DBC−1/2 and TE = BEHEAC−1/2 with
C = AHA. The optimal input covariance matrix Rd =
E(ddH) is related to matrix R as Rd = C−1/2RC−1/2.
Using again the result of [11, Th. 2], the secrecy capacity at
high SNR becomes
lim
P→+∞
COFDMs =
M∑
m=1
[
log σ2m
(
TBT
†
E
)]+
.
If Eve uses a conventional CP-OFDM receiver (BE = BB),
we have TE = DEC−1/2 with DE defined analogously as
DB , implying that
lim
P→+∞
COFDMs =
M∑
m=1
[
log
|HB(fm)|2
|HE(fm)|2
]+
,
3which is equivalent to the secrecy capacity of M parallel
independent wiretap channels. For a fixed LCP , as M grows
large (and thus N ), the sum converges to an integral and the
OFDM secrecy capacity will converge to the generic one.
V. SECRECY CAPACITY OF FBMC-OQAM
We consider an FBMC-OQAM system with M subcarriers
and Ns multicarrier symbols. The real-valued multicarrier
symbols, denoted by dm,l with m = 0, ...,M − 1 and
l = 0, ..., Ns − 1, are modulated using a prototype pulse
g[n] of length Mκ, where κ is the so-called overlapping
factor, i.e., g[n] = 0 if n /∈ [0,Mκ− 1]. The FBMC-OQAM
modulated signal can be expressed as [7, Section 2.1]
s[n] =
M−1∑
m=0
Ns−1∑
l=0
dm,l
m+lg[n− lM/2]e 2piM m(n−Mκ−12 ),
for n = 0, ...N − 1 with N = (Ns + 2κ − 1)M/2. Note
that real-valued multicarrier symbols are spaced only M/2
samples apart in time instead of M + LCP for complex
symbols in CP-OFDM so that the spectral efficiency is similar
for both modulations. To be exact, the CP-OFDM spectral
efficiency is penalized by the CP insertion. On the other hand,
the FBMC-OQAM spectral efficiency is impacted by tails of
length (2κ− 1)M/2 due to the spread of g[n] over multiple
multicarrier symbols, which induces an overhead particularly
detrimental for small bursts but negligible for long burst (as
Ns grows large). Similarly as the capacity analysis in [12],
we reformulate the transmit signal using a matrix formalism
giving
s = Ad˜,
where
d˜ =
 d0...
dNs−1
 ∈ RMNs×1, dl =
 d0,l...
dM−1,l
 ∈ RM×1,
and matrix A ∈ CN×MNs is defined as follows: the element
located at the n-th row and m + lM -th column is given by
m+lg[n − lM/2]e 2piM m(n−Mκ−12 ). At the receiver side, the
legitimate receiver, Bob, discards the last LB − 1 symbols,
using matrix SB = (IN , 0N×LB−1) and demodulates
the signal by applying matrix AH . If the filter g[n] has
perfect reconstruction properties, this leads to the identity
<(AHA) = IMNs , so that, under ideal propagation condition
and synchronization (HB = I, SB = I and wB = 0), the
transmit symbols are recovered after demodulation and real
conversion.
In practice however, the multipath channel must be equal-
ized before real conversion to avoid inter-symbol and inter-
carrier interference. The obtained samples at Bob and Eve
can generally be written as
zB = BBHBAd˜+BBwB , zE = BEHEAd˜+BEwE .
The equalizer can be designed in many different ways, see
[7, Section 2.1.5] for a review. The most conventional way
consists in single-tap per-subcarrier equalization as in CP-
OFDM. However, as the channel becomes more selective
in frequency, the system will be impacted by inter-symbol
and inter-carrier interference. Improved equalizer designs rely
on a multi-tap structure to estimate the current symbol dm,l
based on demodulated symbols at neighboring multicarrier
symbols and subcarriers. In the following, we will first derive
the FBMC-OQAM secrecy capacity for general matrices BB
and BE . We will then consider different types of equalizers
at Bob and Eve.
Before going further, one should note that vector d˜ is real-
valued and hence E(d˜d˜
T
) 6= 0 so that vectors zB and zE
are improper, i.e., E(zBzTB) 6= 0 and E(zEzTE) 6= 0. Hence,
conventional results for the complex circularly symmetric
Gaussian case do not hold. Therefore, we introduce the
following real-valued notations for matrices and vectors: for
arbitrary vector v and matrix V, vector vr and matrix Vr
are defined as
vr =
(<(v)
=(v)
)
, Vr =
(<(V) −=(V)
=(V) <(V)
)
.
Subscript "r" stands for real-valued. We also define I˜ =
(IMNs 0MNs×MNs)
T . Using these definitions, the perfect
reconstruction property becomes I˜
T
ATrAr I˜ = IMNs and the
power constraint on transmitted symbols s = Ar I˜d˜ directly
translates into a constraint on symbols d˜
tr [Rs] = tr
[
Ar I˜Rd˜I˜
T
ATr
]
= tr
[
Rd˜
] ≤ P.
Using this real-valued formalism, the demodulated signal at
Bob and Eve can be rewritten as
zB,r = BB,rHB,rAr I˜d˜+BB,rwB,r
zE,r = BE,rHE,rAr I˜d˜+BE,rwE,r. (4)
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1. The FBMC-OQAM secrecy capacity CFBMCs ,
under a transmit power constraint, can be written as
CFBMCs = max
Rd˜,tr[Rd˜]≤P
1
2
log
∣∣∣I+TB,rRd˜TTB,r∣∣∣∣∣∣I+TE,rRd˜TTE,r∣∣∣ , (5)
where TB,r = R
−1/2
w,B BB,rHB,rAr I˜ and TE,r =
R
−1/2
w,E BE,rHE,rAr I˜. Matrices Rw,B = 1/2BB,rB
T
B,r and
Rw,E = 1/2BE,rB
T
E,r are the noise covariance matrix at
Bob and Eve.
Proof: See Appendix.
As in the generic case, this optimization problem is non
convex and high dimensional, which makes it hard to solve,
even numerically. The factor 1/2 comes from the fact that
multicarrier symbols composed of real symbols are transmit-
ted instead of complex ones. The following result gives a
closed-form expression of the secrecy capacity at high SNR.
Using again the result of [11, Th. 2] as in the generic and
OFDM cases, the FBMC-OQAM secrecy capacity at high
SNR is
lim
P→+∞
CFBMCs =
1
2
MNs∑
k=1
[
log σ2k
(
TB,rT
†
E,r
)]+
. (6)
We now study different equalization structures at Bob and
Eve. We distinguish between two extreme cases for Bob
receiver structure: 1) multi-tap equalization, 2) single-tap
equalization. We consider that Eve also has the choice to use
these two receivers plus the generic (ideal) receiver given by
BE = I, which does not discard any received samples and
does not apply FBMC-OQAM demodulation.
41) Multi-tap Equalization: In this case, we set BB,r =
ATr SB,r and we look at the secrecy capacity before real
conversion. This can be seen as a multi-tap equalizer making
use of the information contained in all of the complex-
valued neighboring symbols. Similarly, Eve can also use a
multi-tap equalizer BE,r = ATr SE,r. The FBMC-OQAM
secrecy capacity and high SNR secrecy capacity with multi-
tap equalization are respectively given by (5) and (6), using
the new definition of BB,r.
2) Single-Tap Equalization: In contrast with the previous
section, we now study the performance of the most simple
equalization scheme, which consists in i) single-tap equaliza-
tion by multiplying each subcarrier output by the conjugate
of the channel frequency response and ii) real conversion.
This gives
BB,r = I˜
T
D˜
T
B,rA
T
r SB,r, (7)
where D˜B,r is the real-valued representation of D˜B =
(INs ⊗DB). Note that Eve can also use a single-tap equal-
izer as given in (7) but matched to her own channel. The
FBMC-OQAM secrecy capacity and high SNR secrecy ca-
pacity with single-tap equalization are respectively given by
(5) and (6), using the new definition of BB,r in (7).
The following theorem shows that, for mildly frequency
selective channels, single-tap equalization at Bob incurs no
loss as compared to multi-tap equalization and even ideal
equalization.
Theorem 2. As LBM → 0 and for well time-frequency lo-
calized prototype filters [13, (As2)], FBMC-OQAM demod-
ulation with single-tap and multi-tap equalization achieves
the same capacity as ideal equalization. Hence, the secrecy
capacity CFBMCs is identical for single-tap, multi-tap and
generic equalization at Bob and Eve, for any P . Moreover,
the high SNR secrecy capacity then becomes
lim
P→+∞
CFBMCs =
Ns
2
M∑
m=1
[
log
|HB(fm)|2
|HE(fm)|2
]+
.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result is optimistic in that single-tap equalization
has a much lower complexity than multi-tap and generic
equalization structures. Moreover, the high SNR secrecy
capacity is again equivalent to the secrecy capacity of M
parallel independent wiretap channels as in CP-OFDM.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We now evaluate numerically the high SNR secrecy ca-
pacity of the different transceivers previously studied. Sim-
ulations are performed relying on the Matlab-based Wave-
ComBox toolbox [14]. For a fair comparison, the secrecy
capacity is normalized in terms of bits per sample, i.e.,
dividing obtained expressions of Cs by N . The generic
secrecy capacity is computed in the large N case. The number
of subcarriers and the subcarrier spacing are fixed to M = 64
and 15 kHz respectively for both CP-OFDM and FBMC-
OQAM modulations. For CP-OFDM, as explained earlier,
given that successive multicarrier symbols do not overlap,
it is sufficient to consider a single multicarrier symbol, i.e.,
Ns = 1. For FBMC-OQAM, the prototype filter is the
conventional PHYDYAS pulse [15] with overlapping factor
κ = 2. To take into account the capacity penalty due
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Fig. 2: High SNR ergodic secrecy capacity for mildly fre-
quency selective channel.
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to tail effects, the number of multicarrier symbols Ns is
varied to evaluate differences between short and long burst
transmissions. Bob and Eve channels, hB [n] and hE [n], are
generated according to either the ITU Veh. A model or the
the ITU Veh. B model, i.e., a mildly and a highly frequency
selective channel respectively. The averaged power of both
channels is normalized to one.
Fig. 2 shows the high SNR ergodic secrecy capacity,
i.e., the secrecy capacity averaged over channel statistics,
of generic, CP-OFDM and FBMC-OQAM modulations as a
function of Ns, for an ITU Veh. A channel. The gap between
the OFDM and the generic secrecy capacity is due to the CP
insertion, of length LCP =M/8 = 8 here. Moreover, if Eve
is not constrained to use a conventional CP-OFDM receiver,
an additional loss is induced. On the FBMC-OQAM side, we
see that all transceiver configurations at Bob and Eve, namely,
single-tap (S-T), multi-tap (M-T) and generic equalization,
reach a similar performance, as foreseen by Th. 2 given the
mildly frequency selective nature of the ITU Veh. A channel.
Moreover, as explained earlier, FBMC-OQAM suffers from
a capacity penalty due to tail effects. As Ns grows large, this
overhead becomes negligible and it outperforms OFDM.
Fig. 3 plots the cumulative density function of the high
SNR secrecy capacity for the highly frequency selective
ITU Veh. B channel. The OFDM gap from the generic
secrecy capacity is increased because the CP length has to be
increased to LCP = 19 to compensate for the longer channel
impulse response. For a fixed number of multicarrier symbols
5Ns = 20, the FBMC curves outperform OFDM ones. We
also see that the secrecy capacity is improved if Eve uses
FBMC-OQAM demodulation and single-tap equalization. In
some cases, the secrecy capacity becomes even higher than
the generic secrecy capacity. Note that this is only possible
because Eve uses a suboptimal receiver.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have characterized the FBMC-OQAM
secrecy capacity over a frequency selective channel. The
secrecy capacity is formulated as an optimization problem
that has a closed-form in the high SNR regime. Single-tap and
multi-tap equalizers were compared and were shown to be
equivalent for mildly frequency selective channels. We have
also shown that FBMC-OQAM is particularly competitive
for medium-to-long burst transmission as compared to the
OFDM and generic secrecy capacity. A promising research
direction includes the extension of this study to multiple-
antenna systems taking different FBMC-OQAM beamform-
ing and equalization techniques into account.
VIII. APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: We need to derive the secrecy
capacity of the real MIMO wiretap channel given in (4),
under the transmit power constraint tr [Rs] = tr
[
Rd˜
] ≤ P .
The noise samples can be colored after demodulation and
equalization, depending on the structure of BB,r and BE,r.
To whiten the noise samples, one can multiply zB,r and zE,r
by R−1/2w,B and R
−1/2
w,E respectively, where Rw,B and Rw,E
are defined in Th. 1. Note that this operation is invertible
and does not affect the information contained at Bob and
Eve. Using the definitions introduced in Th. 1, we obtain
z˜B,r = TB,rd˜+ w˜B,r, z˜E,r = TE,rd˜+ w˜E,r.
We can then apply the result of [16, Th. 3] and we find the
result of Th. 1. Secrecy capacity is achieved without channel
prefixing and by choosing d˜ as a zero mean real Gaussian
vector with covariance Rd˜.
Proof of Theorem 2: We need to show that the capacity
with single-tap, multi-tap and ideal equalization is equivalent
for mildly frequency selective channels. For clarity we omit
subscripts "B" and "E" in this section as the result needs
to be proven at Bob and Eve and the proof is completely
symmetrical. Given the identity |I +AB| = |I + BA|, the
FBMC-OQAM capacity with single-tap, multi-tap and ideal
equalization become equivalent if the product (Tr)TTr = K
for some fixed K and for Tr ∈ {TSingler ,TMultir ,TGenr }. To
show this, we will use the three following results. Under
general assumptions on the prototype filter g[n], the method-
ology used in [13], relying on a Taylor approximation of the
channel variations in frequency, can be used to show that
ATr SrHrAr = A
T
rArD˜r + 1 (8)
I˜
T
D˜
T
rA
T
rArD˜r I˜ =
(
INs ⊗DHD
)
+ 2 (9)
I˜
T
ATrH
T
rHrAr I˜ =
(
INs ⊗DHD
)
+ 3, (10)
and the approximation errors ‖1‖, ‖2‖ and ‖3‖ go to zero
at rate LM as
L
M → 0. For the multi-tap case, we have Br =
ATr Sr and
lim
L/M→0
TMultir
(8)
= R
−1/2
w,B A
T
rArDr I˜
lim
L/M→0
(
TMultir
)T
TMultir
(9)
= 2
(
INs ⊗DHD
)
.
For the single-tap case, we have Br = I˜
T
D˜
T
rA
T
r Sr and
lim
L/M→0
TSingler
(8,9)
= R
−1/2
w,B
(
INs ⊗DHD
)
lim
L/M→0
(TSingler )
TTSingler
(9)
= 2
(
INs ⊗DHD
)
.
For the generic (ideal) case, we have Br = I and
TGenr =
√
2HrAr I˜
lim
L/M→0
(TGenr )
TTGenr
(10)
= 2
(
INs ⊗DHD
)
,
which shows that (Tr)TTr is well identical for each type of
equalization structure. Inserting these last results in (6) gives
the final result of Th. 2.
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